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INTRODUCTION 
 
As the executive body of the European Union the European Commission plays a central role 
in the functioning of the political and economic union. For the Commission itself to perform it 
demanding function however, it is dependent on a constant supply of information, information 
that is for an important part provided by non-state groups. Despite the fact that the European 
Commission is responsible for policies affecting potentially more than 500 million citizens, its 
members lack both the time and resources to gather all information  needed for effective and 
efficient policy-making. Therefore, in order formulate its proposals the Commission needs to 
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draw on external knowledge. This is where interest groups play a crucial role. While 
legislators are usually generalists, knowing ‘something’ on a large variety of subjects, those 
who lobby for an interest group are generally regarded as experts in a certain policy area. 
They possess information on a specific topic that is technical, specialist and trustworthy; data 
that is crucial for effective policy making, yet costly to gather for those like legislators who 
operate at some distance from the sector itself (Hall & Deardorff, 2006: 74).  
 This expertise of interest groups is acknowledged by the Commission, which actively 
seeks to include these groups in its decision-making process in order to improve the quality 
and the legitimacy of its proposals (Eising, 2007:208). However, despite the fact that it is 
easier for interest groups to gather high quality knowledge in their area of expertise compared 
to other actors such as the Commission, they have little reason to distribute this information 
altruistically on behalf of society (Esterling, 2004: 10). On the contrary. As stated by 
Chalmers (2013: 39) interest groups are in a good position to use the ‘information asymmetry’ 
to gain access to European decision-makers; they exchange their expert information for access 
which enables them to have their voices heard and to have a chance to influence European 
policy.   
 However, access by information supply is not expected to be equal to all types of 
interests. Based on three factors, groups representing business interest (companies, business 
associations, etc.) are more likely to have access to European decision makers than those 
representing diffuse interest (which embody various kinds of public interests like consumers, 
environmental groups and professional organizations). First, groups representing diffuse  
interest have a large numerical disadvantage over those who represent business interest, as 
two-thirds of the formal EU interest groups is business related while diffuse interest make up 
only one-fourth (Hix & Hyland, 2011: 208-13). Second, because of their societal character 
and the broad range of issues that they represent, the diffuse interest groups have a tendency 
to be less focused and less organized than business interests. Third, because of their diverse 
membership, diffuse groups need to rely more on complex collective organizations than their 
business counterparts in order to secure resources, which can hamper effective lobbying 
(Eising, 2009: 215; Hix & Hyland, 2011: 226). Based factors stated above, business interests 
are expected to have a better chance of producing the kind of information or 'expert 
knowledge' that the European Commission needs for its policies and therefore are structurally 
able to gain more access to this important European institution. Such an imbalance in access 
would be highly problematic. If business groups are systematically able to supply more expert 
knowledge to the Commission which ‘buys’ them more access to European legislators, one 
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could reasonably expect them to have more influence on European policy compared to diffuse 
interest groups. In other words, as Eising (2007: 384) states: “systematic variances in these 
access patters can lead to biased politics”. This imbalance can lead to what the author has 
called a system of ‘élite pluralism’, which runs counter to the core principles on which he 
Union was founded.  
 The use information as a lobbying tool by interest groups has attracted attention from 
scholars for years. The literature on lobbying as informational exchange has so far mainly 
looked at access patterns and used them as a proxy for influence. While we know from 
authors focusing on the demand side of this process what kind of informational needs 
legislators have, literature focusing on the supply side - the actual provision of such 
information by interest groups - is still scarce (Chalmers, 2013: 40). Moreover, many authors 
have used the concept of ‘expert knowledge’ in their theories of lobbying as informational 
exchange, but none have so far operationalized this concept in order to measure its role in 
lobbying. This is a gap in the literature that needs to be addressed. If the provision of expert 
knowledge results in more access and more access leads to greater influence, then gaining 
more insight the workings of expert knowledge will help our understanding of the workings 
of  informational lobbying, especially from the supply side. Therefore, the central question of 
this research is: to what extent are interest groups representing business interests better able to 
deliver expert knowledge to the European Commission compared to ‘diffuse’ interest groups?  
 A central challenge related to answering this question is the conceptualization and 
operationalization of the notion of expertise, which is essential in order to measure the extent 
to which the EU is subject to conditions of élite pluralism. To measure expertise, I use (the 
number of) 'references' as an indicator and the (the length of) causal stories as a proxy. The 
presence of the references shows that the information the interest group is providing is 
connected to a larger community of knowledge, similar to the way scholarly references 
demonstrate that the researcher is informed about the 'state of knowledge' in the field. The 
more references there are, the more connected the lobbying effort is to a broader community 
of knowledge and therefore the more likely the presence of expertise. Causal stories will be 
used as a proxy for expertise based on Esterling's (2004:7) prediction that causal stories are 
generally built on expertise. In order to strengthen the proxy, I only look at causal stories 
dealing with expected consequences, based on the expectation that a well-argued prediction of 
a future situation can only be based on extensive (expert) knowledge of the past and presence. 
Causal stories will be measured by the number of words, where more words mean more 
expertise.  
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 The data for the dependent variable expertise was gathered from the contributions to 
the European Commission's Open Consultation System, which constitutes an accessible way 
to look at the lobbying efforts of various interest groups.  The data derived from these 
consultation submission was analysed using ordinary least squares regression. Two important 
findings are presented. First, no evidence is found that there are indeed differences between 
the interest group types and the amount of expert information they supply to the Commission, 
which would imply that there no system élite pluralism in which business interest groups have 
more access. Second, if anything, diffuse interest groups seem to be providing more expert 
information to the Commission, showing that they have closed the gap and have adapted 
successfully to the institutional changes in the EU's structure in recent decades.  
 This article will proceed as follows: first I present an overview of the existing 
literature of expert knowledge and interest group and informational lobbying. Next, I present 
my theoretical framework from which I derive the hypotheses regarding the relation between 
interest group type and the supply of expert information. Subsequently I explain my and 
research design and present the results of the empirical analyses. I conclude the article with a 
summary of the main findings and recommendations for future research. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the first part of the literature review I will focus what has been written so far on the 
definition of ‘expert knowledge’, in the second part I discuss the literature that is more 
generally concerned with answering the research question. 
 Bouwen (2002: 369) discusses three types of information which private interest groups 
typically supply in relation to the requirements of the European institutions: expert 
knowledge, information about the European encompassing interest (IEEI) and information 
about the domestic encompassing interest (IDEI). While expert knowledge relates to technical 
information about the workings of the market in particular policy areas, the IEEI refers more 
broadly to the “needs and interests of a sector in the European economic arena” with the IDEI  
as its domestic equivalent (ibid.). The type of information an interest group provides is 
determined by the informational need the European decision-maker has for drafting policy. A 
similar situation is also found in the US. According Hall & Deardorff  (2006: 74), who deal 
with the lobbyist-legislative relation in the US, compared to legislators lobbyists are 
specialists, who can provide the former with two types of information which legislators need 
in order to perform their law-making functions. The first type includes in-depth policy 
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analyses, reports and expertise; high quality, research based information which is costly for 
legislators to gather and assimilate, but is provided to them in a “politically user-friendly” 
form by lobbyist (ibid.). The second type of information is political intelligence, which 
lobbyist built up by monitoring certain legislative development and by positioning themselves 
in issue networks. This enables the lobbyist not only to have information about the current 
state of affairs, but also what the positions of other actors are (ibid.). The same division is 
broadly made by Chalmers (2013: 46) when he discusses the distinction between 
expert/technical information, which tends to be highly technical, scientific, objective and data 
driven and politically salient information, which contains intelligence on public support and 
normative and value-laden claims. Based on interview data however, the author also presents 
a more specific disaggregation between information types namely: information about legal 
matters, information about the feasibility of implementing a proposal, information that makes 
technical or scientific data understandable, information about public opinion, information 
about economic impact and information about the social impact (ibid.).  
 Two vital points are to be distinguished here. One is that legislators generally have a 
need for external information, while interest groups play an important role in fulfilling that 
need. The second is that legislators do not just need 'information'. They need and are 
interested in a specific type of information that helps them to achieve their legislative 
objectives. If interest groups want to gain access to legislators, they need to fulfil those 
specific informational needs, regardless whether they are technical or related to political 
saliency. In the case of the European Commission it has been argued extensively (Chalmers, 
2013: 41; Eising, 2009: 208; Bouwen, 2002: 379, Boswell, 2008:477-478) that it requires 
technical or expert information. Popular support is less important to the Commission 
compared to elected bodies like the European parliament and therefore it is less interested in 
politically salient information. However, because it has no need for direct popular support, its 
legitimacy is for a large part dependent quality of its output. Since the Commission operates 
in a uncertain environment - often in legislative regions where no similar proposals have 
existed - it values technical and expert knowledge highly in order to assess the implications of 
its proposals as accurately as possible to ensure it retains its legitimacy (Boswell, 2008: 474).   
 While no previous research exists on the link between the role of expert knowledge in 
informational lobbying, several authors have identified important aspect connected to expert 
information, namely causality. Chalmers (2013:51) found that a common characteristic of the 
most used types of  information was an “implicit cause-effect logic”, which the author sees as 
an important addition to the aforementioned dichotomy between data-driven and politically 
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salient information. Esterling (2004:2) further expands on this aspect of causal relationships in 
expert knowledge when discussing the concept of expert informed politics. He argues that 
such policies are often “complex and technical and may include such methods as incentives 
regulation, economic deregulation, optimal risk regulation an public goods and information 
production” (Esterling, 2004:1). Using empirical research policy experts can estimate the 
quality of these proposals by incorporating them in long and often complex causal 
relationship between government-action and real world outcomes. Esterling (2004: 6-7) 
argues lobbying consists of constructing ‘causal frameworks’ wherein “political actors can 
learn about their self-interests in complex issues”. Central to this argument is the fact that 
extrinsic preferences about public policies are valued above intrinsic preferences, which 
means that groups prefer the outcomes of a policy above its moral or symbolic qualities. The 
hypotheses contained in the causal framework regarding the expected outcome are built on 
expertise or what Esterling (2004:7) calls “the state of knowledge of a policy proposal”. 
Hypothetical causal relationships matter, but only to the extent that they are supported by 
evidence: the research-based state of knowledge of a policy can influence the credibility of 
the causal frameworks proposed by different lobby groups (Esterling, 2004:9). Causality is a 
crucial aspect of the concept of ‘expert knowledge’ since it creates a context for 
technical/data-driven information, which makes this information interpretable for legislators 
that have a need for it in their legislative work. So while, as stated earlier the Commission has 
a strong link to expert knowledge, expert knowledge itself has a strong connection to the 
concept of causal relations (backed up by evidence).  
 If expert knowledge gains weight by technical/data-driven data incorporated into a 
causal framework, then those who are better able to produce the latter should be better in 
providing expert knowledge. This, according to Dür & de Bièvre (2007:81), constitutes a 
problem for diffuse interest groups. They first stress the potential organization problems that 
these interests groups are faced with due to the free riders problem, which can seriously 
hinder any effort to get organized, an essential attribute of being able to engage in any form of 
lobbying. Subsequently, the authors argue that in order to mobilize their supporters, which 
provide them with resources, diffuse interest groups are “compelled constantly to appeal to 
general principles such as equity, social justice, and environmental protection rather than to 
make concrete policy proposals” (Dür & de Bièvre, 2007: 82). These are politically salient 
topics which allow them to have their voices heard, but since the quality of expert knowledge 
is determined by a combination of causal and technical/data-driven information, their voices – 
at least to the European Commission - do not have the same appeal as those who are able to 
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produce this kind of information. As Chalmers (2013: 42) summarizing the arguments of 
Michalowitz states: “public interest groups possess information about ‘public support’ and are 
thus hard pressed to find an audience outside the Parliament”. Groups representing business 
interests on the other hand find themselves in an excellent position to provide expert 
knowledge. They are better organized, have more resources and are better suited to provide 
the technical, high quality information the European Commission desires (Bouwen,  2002: 
369).   
 However, despite these intuitively convincing arguments, scholars have found mixed 
result for a large bias in the provision of expert knowledge in favour of business interests. For 
example, Eising (2007: 399) finds that legislators in EU institutions generally consult a broad 
group of stakeholders in policy making. He argues that even though there are imbalances in 
the system of interest representation in favour of business interests because of their expertise 
and economic cloud, the EU “does not necessarily display a form of élite pluralism in which 
firms have invariably better access than associations to the policy-making” (ibid.). Chalmers 
(2013: 51) on the other hand argues that “evidence-based policy making appears to be 
common across all interest group types”. Contrary to what Dür & de Bièvre state, he finds 
that both private interests like companies and diffuse interests like NGO’s frequently use 
technical information in their information provision to policy-makers. While NGO’s do 
generally more often provide information about public opinion, their contributions aren’t 
limited to this type of information which Dür & de Bièvre (2007: 83) have called “of little 
value”. The ability of diffuse interest groups to provide similar information as their business 
counterparts may indicate that times have changed since lobbying started in Brussels. Diffuse 
interest groups may have lagged behind still in the '80s and '90s, but some authors argue that 
they have caught up by now. Klüver (2012: 97) notes that the professionalization of NGO’s 
has led to more policy expertise and a better understanding of the EU institutions, which 
correspond to Chalmers’ (2013: 51) statement that “lobbying in the EU is less and less about 
shouting slogans and waving banners and more about approaching the policy making process 
as policy experts and speaking the language of decision makers”. Institutional changes over 
the past few years may also have played a role here. The fact that there now is a single 
political centre where interest groups can focus their efforts has been helpful for diffuse 
interest to lobby more effectively. As explained by Hix and Hyland (2011: 226), instead of 
fighting for a cause in several states in a relatively uncoordinated way as they used to, diffuse 
interest groups can now focus they efforts in a coordinated transnational action plan and 
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defend their interest in Brussels.  
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Resource dependency theory / Exchange Theory 
Exchange and the closely related resource dependency theories have been used for a number 
of years to study interest intermediation in the European Union and are still highly relevant in 
current studies. Exchange theories assert that in the interaction between private and public 
organizations an interorganizational exchange takes place which is motivated by cost benefit 
analysis. Such an exchange relationship between the actors is only durable when both of them 
benefit from the interaction (Bouwen, 2002: 368). Like the exchange theory, resource 
dependency theory also emphasizes the importance of the exchange of resources between 
organization, but subsequently focuses more on the interdependence that follow from this 
exchange relation (ibid.). Organization like the European Commission are, so the theory 
states, not internally self-sufficient: they need resources from organizations and groups in 
their environment. European institutions and interest groups thus become intertwined in a 
system of interdependence: they need resources from each other. European institutions require 
information that interest groups have in order to make informed policy decisions, while 
interest groups want to have their voices heard (‘access’) on the European level of governance 
and can do this by the provision of specific information about a certain issue. The more 
relevant information an interest group can provide (the resource they supply), the more 
chance they have to steer European legislation in a direction that is in line with their interests 
(the ‘resource’ interest groups receive). 
  In the original resource dependency theory, Pfeffer and Salancik argue that the degree 
of dependence is determined by two factors: the presence of these resources in the 
environment of the organization and the value of these resources for the organization 
(Poppelaars, 2009: 248). Knowing these factors, actors are expected to make a strategic 
choice based on a cost/benefit analysis, aimed at gathering the required resources while at the 
same time minimizing their dependence on other groups. In other words, actors will try to 
keep their autonomy intact as far as possible (ibid.). If we follow these assumptions made by 
Pfeffer and Salancik, the possible impact of a bias in the provision of expert information 
could extend even beyond what has been described as 'élite pluralism'. If Commission would 
be able to get the resources it needs from one source (business), it will not be automatically 
inclined to decrease its autonomy by incorporating other (in this case diffuse) interest groups, 
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at least not long as its legitimacy is not so much based on popular support but on the 
outcomes of its policies. While the Commission by its nature as a European institution would 
not completely disregard diffuse interest, the possibility of crowding out other interest as for 
as possible would be an additional stimulant for business interest who already have more 
resources, a clearer focus and more effective organizational structure to make an extra effort 
to provide more expert knowledge than their diffuse counterparts.  
 Expectations regarding the provision of expert knowledge are further derived from the 
combination of the resource mobilisation and organizational contingency theory (Klüver, 
2012: 493). Resource mobilization theory argues that actors are rational in employing their 
resources towards a certain goal, while those with greater resources expected to have a higher 
likelihood of actually attaining it (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004: 116). Similarly to middle-
class who, because of their privileged access to resources compared poor groups, predominate 
the social movement sector, business are expected groups to actually use their greater 
resources to predominate the supply of expert information towards the Commission (Edwards 
& McCarthy, 2004: 117). However, business interest groups are not just better situated 
because they have more resources. In line with the organizational contingency theory I argue 
that the higher the degree of fit between the organizational configuration of the interest group 
and the institutional setting in which it operates, the more efficient the lobbying efforts of the 
interest group will be (Donaldson, 1999: 51). As stated by Klüver (2012: 494) in her 
discussion of the contingency theory in relation to interest group lobby: "fit is the key to 
performance". Regarding the European Union's institutional setting in which interest groups 
have to operate Klüver (ibid.) identified three crucial features: the EU's multilevel character, 
the fragmentation of powers across its different levels and institutions, and the degree of 
horizontal segmentation of policy making in the Union. This complex institutional 
environment creates uncertainty regarding the legislative outcomes of a policy process, which 
in turn makes it hard for interest groups to oversee and keep tabs on the process. Business 
interest have an advantage here over diffuse interest groups, as the former are more often 
structured according to a functional segmentation that corresponds better with that of the 
European Commission than the latter. Companies have more experience with intern 
segmentation and operating in different sectors and markets while at the same time retaining a 
general oversight, which is similar to the organizational structure of the European 
Commission. Resources play a role here though. Since business interest groups have more 
(financial) resources, they are able to employ more specifically trained personal in order to 
match the complex system of the European legislation.  
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 The theories described above emphasize an interdependency between interest groups 
and the European institutions and furthermore provide an insight into the nature of that 
relation. While resource mobilisation and organizational contingency theory have been 
combined by Klüver (2012), the addition of the resource dependency theory to the mix 
constitutes and interesting new addition to the literature. Combining the three theories has led 
me to expect that groups representing business interest, due to their greater resources and 
better institutional fit, will better able to provide the information that constitutes a crucial link 
in the interdependent relation between the European Commission and interest groups. This 
had led me to the following hypothesis:  
H2 Interest groups representing business interests will be able to provide more expert 
knowledge than those groups represented diffuse interests. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
In this section, I will explain how the dataset used to test the aforementioned hypotheses was 
constructed and how the variables have been operationalized. First, I will discuss my 
dependent variable 'expertise', a word has been used frequently by authors regarding the 
lobbying of interest groups, yet empirically still constitutes a black box. So far little to no 
work has been done to operationalize and measure it as a dependent variable. In this section I 
will explain how I have operationalized this variable using ‘References’ as an indicator and 
‘Causal Stories’ as a proxy for expert knowledge. Following this discussion of my dependent 
variable I will discuss the data selection of consultation documents and interest groups used in 
this research. Finally, in the last segment of this section I will discuss the construction of the 
independent and control variables.  
Dependent Variable 
References 
In this research a reference is understood as the in-text mentioning of an aspect related to the 
subject under discussion. Such an 'aspect' can constitute various things, ranging from an 
organization to a piece of legislation and from specific regulations in a sector to an account of 
a specific situation. This broad interpretation of what constitutes a reference is due to the fact 
that, as a dependent variable, references are meant to measure the extent to which the 
lobbying effort of an actor is connected to the state of knowledge of a certain topic. This is 
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somewhat contrary to the ‘narrow’ definition of references in scholarly work wherein the 
word is mainly linked to research or academic contributions of other scholars. However, 
unlike academic writers, those who contribute information to the Commission are not bound 
by general rules or formal quality standards regarding their references. Therefore, in order to 
assess how embedded the information is in the broad ‘state of knowledge’, we need to look at 
other indicators besides the mere references to empirical research. Actors in this research 
occasionally do refer to (academic) research, but also rely for their information and data on 
other sources such as legislative documents, developments in their sector or their own 
experiences or those of associated organisations. These need to be included when counting 
references in order to assess how connected the information provided by the actor is to a 
wider community of knowledge. 
 While I use a broader definition of what constitutes a references, the logic behind the 
use of references as an indicator of the embeddedness in a state of knowledge is similar to the 
ways references are used by scholars. In the academic world referring to the work of others 
scholars or certain concepts specifically related to a topic is an indicator that the author is 
informed about the ‘state of knowledge’ in the field and is able to put this information into 
perspective. A similar rationale can be applied to the contributions to the consultations. The 
more and the broader (i.e. different types) the references made by the author, the more 
embedded the information is in the ‘state of knowledge’, the higher the likelihood of 
expertise. A ‘state of knowledge’ thus functions as an indicator of expert knowledge. A higher 
number of references, means a better embeddedness into a broader network of knowledge 
which in turn means that the documents contains more expertise.  
 I have further operationalized references as follows. Based on preliminary readings of 
a number of consultations, I have selected types of references that have the highest chance of 
referring to sector specific information as indicators for assessing the embeddedness in the 
‘state of knowledge’. References have to be relevant, i.e. they have to be related to the topic 
on which the interest group is aiming its lobbying efforts.  Subsequently, those types of 
references with similar characteristics are grouped together in dimensions in order to be able 
to differentiate between the categories and to see how certain interests group score on certain 
dimensions. This has led me to the following reference based dimensions: 
 Dimension I: Research 
Relevant Research/Studies/Reports 
Reference to research conducted by scholars 
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Reference to research conducted by other organizations 
Reference to research conducted by the organization itself 
 
References scores in Dimension I show how embedded the information provided by an 
interest group is with regards to relevant research. References to research conducted either by 
scholars, other organizations or the interest group itself show that the author is embedded in 
the state of knowledge, since research constitutes a vital building block of any state of 
knowledge. To have either conducted or to be knowable of the research and be able to refer to 
it shows that the documents has connections to the broader knowledge community. In order to 
be counted as a reference in this dimension, the author of the text has to mention the name of 
the research, who conducted the research and in what year the research was published.  
 
 Dimension II: Legislation  
Relevant Legislation/Guidelines/Directives/Court rulings: 
Reference to National legislation/guidelines/directives/court rulings 
Reference to European legislation/guidelines/directives/court rulings 
Reference to  Global legislation/guidelines/directives/court rulings 
References scores in Dimension II show how embedded the information provided by an 
interest group is with regards to national, European or global legislation (such as UN 
Resolutions) or similar measures flowing from legislation. While some sectors may have 
more advanced legislative system than others, almost all sectors on which the European 
Commission wishes to implement legislation have some previous form of legislation already 
in place. To be aware of it and to have references to it shows that the actor is knowledgeable 
of these other legislative effort and that the information is connected to a broader community 
of knowledge.  
 Dimension III: Actors 
Relevant Actors 
Reference to Related organizations (private/NGO operating in the same sector) 
Reference to Related public organizations  
Reference to Other Actors 
References scores in Dimension III show how embedded the information provided by an 
interest group is with regards to other actors who operate in the same sector or are at least 
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involved in the topic the organization is lobbying on. References to actors can either be 
counted under references to organizations, such as private organization, associations or 
NGO's, under public organizations such as national, EU and UN bodies or under Other Actors 
which includes for example the WTO and the International Monetary Fund. Relevant actors 
play a role in the construction in the state of knowledge and can thus be regarded as a sign 
that the actor and the information provided are connected to a broader community of 
knowledge. Direct references to the Commission, the Council or the European Parliament 
however, are not counted as references, since these are too generally known to be suitable as 
indicators of any type of expertise. 
 Dimension IV: Sector Specific  
Account of first/second hand dealings in the sector  
Account of relevant past/current situation in a country regarding issues, events  
Reference to sector specific indices/standards/products 
 
References scores in Dimension IV show how embedded the information provided by an 
interest group is with regards to sector specific experiences, events and (non-legislative) rules, 
indices and products. For accounts of first/second hand dealings to be counted as references, 
there has to be an explicit statements (''In our experience", "As X has experienced") in the text 
that the information comes from the actor's own experience or that of another actor's dealings 
in the sector. Such accounts are to be counted as references because they show the actor is 
either participant to the construction state of knowledge or is able to connect its information to 
those who are. The second reference in this dimension, account of a past/current situation, 
demonstrates that actor and the information the actors provides are connected to real world 
situations related to the topic the interest group is lobbying on. Examples of these kind of 
references are accounts of a price fixing scandal in the United Kingdom in lobbying efforts 
towards EU market regulation and the situation of the Spanish housing market in a lobbying 
effort towards EU state aid regulation. Under the third element of this dimension are counted 
the references to sector specific indices, standards and products, such as the Basel II 
agreements in a lobbying effort on EU banking regulation and the naming of specific types of 
cables in a lobbying effort on the future of internet in Europe. Again, such references are 
counted as indicators because they show that the actor and the information are active 
participants in the construction of the state of knowledge. 
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 Dimension V: Other Publications 
Relevant Publications  
Reference to media reporting  
Reference to previous entries in consultations 
 
References scores in Dimension V show how embedded the information provided by an 
interest group is with regards to other publications than the ones covered in the previous 
dimensions, namely media reporting and entries in previous consultations. While references to 
media reporting demonstrate that the information provided in the lobbying is connected to 
other types of information that are a part of the state of knowledge, references to previous 
entries are a sign that the author has a longer term commitment and interest in the topic, 
which makes it highly likely that the actor is indeed involved in a broader community of 
knowledge. 
 Table 1.0 illustrates the total number of references per dimension, as well as figures on 
the range, mean and standard deviation. The legislative dimension outscores the four other 
dimension both on the total number of references, as on the average references made in each 
of the 120 contributions incorporated in this research. Further, only Dimension IV: Sector 
Specific and Dimension III: Actors are reasonably well represented, while references to 
research are somewhat low, which is somewhat surprising, based on the expectation derived 
from the literature that lobbying is research/evidence based (Hall & Deardorff, 2006: 74).
 References to the same source (for example a certain directive or European law) will 
be counted only once per paragraph. The rationale behind this is that not the references 
themselves are most important, but the fact that they refer to the broader ‘state of knowledge’. 
A paragraph typically deals with one topic so one or more references to the same source in 
that paragraph can be regarded as references to the same ‘state of knowledge’. 
 
Table 1.0: Descriptives of Dimensions  
  N Minimum Maximum Sum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Dimension 
I : 
Research 
119 0 10 133 1,11 2,028 
Dimension 
II: 
119 0 38 1002 8,35 8,057 
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Legislation 
Dimension 
III: Actors 
119 0 36 321 2,67 4,649 
Dimension 
IV: Sector 
Specific 
119 0 51 923 7,69 9,888 
Dimension 
V: Other 
119 0 9 65 ,54 1,347 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
119      
 
 
Different paragraphs generally deal with different topics or at least different aspect of the 
same topic, so if a certain reference is mentioned two times but in different paragraphs the 
reference is counted both times, since they presumably refer to different aspects of the ‘states 
of knowledge’. Especially since contributions to the consultations are written in a formal style 
and are generally written by professional writers it is reasonable to assume that the 
contributions will follow this standard style of writing wherein different paragraphs deal have 
dissimilar topics and therefore references within different paragraphs relate to a different  
‘state of knowledge’. 
 Despite the fact that the number of references indicate how embedded the contributor 
is in ‘state of knowledge’, preliminary readings of consultations have – as stated earlier - 
shown that they are not in all cases the most reliable indicators. The possibility exist that they 
are ‘manipulated’, which makes them not as solid as they need to be in order to be used as a 
proxy. Though in the majority of cases references are found to be a reliable indicator, various 
factors such as writing style or even the policy area can potentially lead to a low or high 
number of references. Therefore, based on the literature, this research will also look at causal 
stories to gauge the amount of expert knowledge in the consultation contributions.  
Causal Stories 
Causal Stories will be measured by using word count, similar to Klüver (2012) who uses word 
count to assess the information supply of interest groups to the European Commission. 
However Klüver, by counting  the total supply of information, makes no distinction with 
regards to what kind information is supplied in the contributions. For measuring the 
submission of expertise knowledge, a distinction between the sort of information is required 
since expertise is a specific type of information that may be part of a document, but rarely 
constitutes an entire document. Directly measuring expertise is however difficult since there is 
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no objective definition of what constitutes expertise. Therefore causal stories are used as a 
proxy, as this type of information is more complex and requires a deeper understanding of the 
subject by the author. There are certain requirements for pieces of information to counted as 
causal stories, which are partly based on Esterling (2004) but also some new additions that 
have not been used in this context (regarding expertise) so far. Information that has been 
identified as containing a causal story will be selected from the document after which the total 
amount of words will be counted. The more words are dedicated to the description of a causal 
story, the higher the amount of expertise in the document.  
  For  information in  a document to be counted as a causal story, it has to contain a 
hypothetical causal relationships: the causal relationship described in the information has to 
refers to a hypothetical future situation. Causal relationships which refer to past or current 
situations are not counted as causal stories but as references (see 'experiences'). This 
distinction between hypothetical (future) and current/past causal relationships is based on the 
logic that is it easier for an actor to give an account of a current situation than to assess what 
will happen in the future. One does not necessarily need to be informed about past situations 
nor even has to have a broader understanding of the sector, to give an account of a current 
situation. Such information shows that the authors have experience or at least knowledge of 
the experiences of others and therefore it should not be disregarded totally. Therefore, 
accounts of causal relationships relating to a current or past situation (X has led to Y) are 
counted as a reference, but as a proxy for expertise they are considered too ‘weak’. A stronger 
indicator of expertise is a hypothetical causal relationship (X will lead to Y). Because of the 
uncertainties involved in assessing future situations, the actor has to be well-informed (i.e. has 
to have expertise) about the current and past situation in order to make a convincing argument 
why the hypothetical causal relationship he or she is advocating is indeed plausible. The logic 
is similar to that of the Pythagorean theorem whereby one needs information on A and B 
(here the past and current situation) in order to calculate the square of the hypotenuse C (the  
Table 2.0: Causal Story Descriptives 
 N Range Minimum Maximum Sum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Causal 
Story 
119 3002 0 3002 96883 807,36 683,272 
 
future situation). One additional requirement for a hypothetical causal relationship to be 
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regarded as a causal story is that there has to be additional information which supports the 
hypotheses. The fact that the relationship is well-argued is crucial, for – in line with Esterling 
- without argumentation the causal story cannot be regarded as a meaningful and therefore 
would not be useful as proxy for expertise. Only stating that X will lead to Y does not 
constitute a causal story and neither is it regarded as a reference. In this research such 
information is regarded as a ‘mere’ statement: it informs the reader of an opinion but does not 
provide any other information, therefore it cannot be used as an indicator nor a proxy of 
expertise. Such statements may be interesting to the European Parliament which is more open 
to matters of public support, but since the Commission is more interested in technical 
knowledge it is not of particular relevance in the Consultation submissions. There are no strict 
guidelines for the sort of argumentation supporting the hypothetical causal relationship; these 
can range from (external) research based argument, to an argument based on experience to an 
argument based on consequences seen in other kinds of legislation. The important aspect is 
that the author is able to support its claims regarding the expected future situation; if they are 
able to do so they are conveying causal stories, i.e. expertise, to the Commission. 
 Table 2.0 illustrates some general figures about amount of words dedicated to causal 
stories in the contributions. A mean of more than 800 words and a standard deviation of more 
than 680 words indicate that while most of the consultation presumably contain a few hundred 
words  devoted to causal stories, there are large differences among the contributions. This is 
also visible in the Minimum and Maximum scores, in which there is a difference of over 3000 
words. 
 In this section I've made a distinction between 'References' as an indicator and ‘Causal 
Stories’ as a proxy for expert knowledge. This distinction between an indicator and a proxy 
may seem artificial, but is nonetheless important, because I assign more weight to the latter 
than to the former. References, as stated earlier, are a sign that the information which is 
supplied to the Commission is embedded in a broader network of actors and information. The 
chance that it is ‘manipulated’ makes it not ideal to be used as a proxy. An author can  -
whether or not consciously -  use a great number of references, without necessarily conveying 
a lot of information. However, because they do show that an actor is embedded in the ‘state of 
knowledge’ they are important as a gauge for expertise, but not strong enough to be regarded 
a proxy. Causal stories are more likely to be a strong indicator of expert knowledge and 
therefore are regarded as a proxy. Because of the higher standards of what is to be counted as 
a causal story, it is less vulnerable to the sort of ‘manipulation’ that can potentially affect 
‘mere’ references. Also, because causal stories are a type of information like expertise itself, 
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they are more suitable as a direct indicator compared to a more indirect indicator such as 
references. 
Data selection 
I will gather my data about the information that is provided by the different interest by 
looking at the (English) submissions in the Open Consultation System of the European 
Commission. In this system the European Commission invites all or at least a large number of 
stakeholders from different sides to comment and provide their views on legislation that the 
Commission is currently working on. The Open Consultations are the most accessible way to 
look at the information that is provided by interest groups in their lobbying efforts to the 
Commission. By "using online consultations”, to speak with Klüver (2012: 498), “it is 
possible to examine the amount of information concerning a specific policy proposal that 
interest groups provide to the European Commission”. In the submissions the interest groups 
not only articulate their lobby position on the issue that is addressed in the consultation, but 
they also provide a motivation for their position and suggestions to – at least in the eyes of the 
interest group – improve the legislative proposal made by the European Commission. 
Important to note here is that interest groups will generally not ‘just’ provide a motivation or a 
suggestion in their submission to the open consultation, but are likely to back it up with 
evidence since - as stated by Chalmers (2013: 51) - “serious lobbying has to be based on facts 
and figures”. This makes the open consultation system interesting for the measuring expertise 
in interest group lobbying. 
 Furthermore, these consultations are highly relevant because a great variety of interest 
groups makes use of this opportunity to provide the Commission with information. As 
Quittkat & Korzian (2011:405) argue, these consultations are regarded as important by 
interest groups because they are employed “early in the policy cycle, when the theme is 
framed and the relevant actors for later stages of EU policy-making are identified”. This 
makes participation in the Open Consultation almost obligatory from interest groups that want 
to be taken seriously later in the policy development stages. Though when focusing on the 
open consultations one only looks at one aspect of the lobbying efforts by interest groups and 
not for example the more informal forms of lobbying, Klüver (2012: 498) has found that is 
plausible that the information supply in the submissions actually correlates with the overall 
information provision by interest groups. The online consultations are accessible through the 
Your Voice In Europe portal (http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/) and the respective websites of 
the different Directorates-General (DG) departments.  
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Case Selection 
Regarding the selection of the consultations, I will only look at consultations from the year 
2012, which is the most recent year with closed consultations. Looking only at one year 
minimizes the effect of time on the outcome, while looking at the most recent year improves 
the chances of good information provision in the consultations because both DGs and interest 
groups have had time to adjust to this relatively new system of lobbying. The 25 consultations 
were selected randomly by assigning each of the 109 consultation of 2012 a number. 
Subsequently by random numbers generation 25 numbers were generated which each 
corresponded to one of the consolations. In the cases were there were no contributions or no 
individual contributions (but for example Commission generated summaries) available, the 
consultation was passed over and another number was generated. Because of the different 
ways the DGs deal with the Consultations not all of the DGs are represented and some DGs 
are overrepresented compared to others (for example DG Competition and Internal Market 
outnumber DGs like Environment and Climate). Such a ‘bias’ is as unfortunate as it is 
unavoidable due to the chaotic system of the different DGs. However, still a broad range of 
DG’s is taken in and there are no signs that this ‘bias’ has had a significant effect on the 
diffuse/business interest group ratio (see table 3.0 below). 
Independent Variable 
Information on the type (either business or diffuse) of interest group, the independent 
variable, is gathered from the Transparency Register (http://europa.eu/transparency-
register/index_en.htm), one of the most accessible systems for information on interest groups 
who are active on the European level. In this system set up by the European Parliament and 
the Commission, interest groups are obliged to classify themselves in broad and narrow 
categories. Because of the relatively small size of the dataset the narrow categories are not 
very relevant, as these categories mainly offer further specification on the kind of subtype the 
interest group find most applicable to themselves. However, the broad categories constitute a 
useful tool to determine the broader interest group type, which is more relevant for this 
research which mainly looks at two interest group categories, namely business and diffuse. 
The broad categories range from one to six, divided into: 
 Professional consultancies/law firms/self-employed consultants 
  In-house lobbyists and trade/professional associations 
  Non-governmental organizations 
 Think tanks, research and academic institutions 
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  Organisations representing churches and religious communities 
  Organisations representing local, regional and municipal authorities other public 
or mixed entities 
For this research the most valuable distinction is those between private/business interest in 
first two broad categories (Professional consultancies/law firms/self-employed consultants, 
In-house lobbyists and trade/professional associations) and diffuse interests in categories three 
to six (non-governmental organisations, think tanks, religious organisations and other public 
or mixed entities). In a larger sample than the 119 interest groups incorporated in this 
research, it may be interesting to specify further in order to see whether there are differences 
within the broad categories. However, in this research, the n for each subsection would be 
very low, which would not provide valuable or relevant outcomes.   
 Since the information is submitted by the organizations themselves, generally updated 
once a year and checked regularly by the Register’s secretariat for errors, data from the 
Register can be considered to be both reliable and up to date. Though it is generally requested 
by the Commission’s DGs, not all those who take part in the Consultations register 
themselves in the Transparency Register. Due time required to gather data about those who 
are not register, the fact that such data may not be available for all groups and the fact that 
standardized data is available on most groups in the Register, I only look at interest groups 
who are in the Register.  
 Because there were sometimes large numbers of contributors to the consultations, a 
selection had to be made of which would be incorporated into the research. This selection of 
interest groups was done in a similar way as with the consultations. Each of the interest 
groups in the selected consultations, registered in the Transparency Register and which fell 
under broad categories 1-6, was assigned a number. Again, random numbers were generated  
 
Table 3.0: Type of Interest Groups  
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Business Interest 
Groups 
89 74,8 74,8 
Diffuse Interest  
Groups 
30 25,2 100,0 
Total 119  100,0  
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and based on these numbers the corresponding interest groups were picked. A maximum of 
five interest groups was picked per consultations. This was done in order to retain somewhat 
of an equal weight of the consultations, as some had only three contributions suitable for this 
research, while other had over ninety. Of the interest groups gathered in this way 74,8 per cent 
was categorized in the Transparency Register in either broad categories 1 or 2, the private 
interest categories (see table 3.0). Diffuse interest categories 3-5 made up the other 25,2 per 
cent. These figures are comparable with those in others research (Klüwer 2012; Quittkat 
2011). 
Control Variables 
The Register also contains information regarding the interest group’s resources (number of 
persons employed in lobbying, total lobbying costs) and fields of interest (subnational, 
national, European and global). Group resources can function a control variable for the main 
independent variable in this research (the type of interest group), to see whether it is indeed 
the case that the type of interest group and not just resources. However, because of the 
relatively strong link between resources and the type of interest group, high correlations 
between the resource variables (staff, lobbying expenditure and Brussels office) and the 
expertise in the document, can also be a reason to again scrutinize the relation between 
interest group type and expertise for that case. Under some circumstances, the resource related 
can figure as a sort of 'signal' or 'back up' variable, indicating that there might be a reason to 
check the data more closely. Field of interest however, will function as regular control 
variable to control for the fact that the presence expert knowledge is not related to a certain 
field/area of interest, but as expected, to the type of interest group.  
 
 
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
In this section I will empirically test the dataset I constructed from the contributions to the 
online consultation regime in order to test the hypotheses formulated in the theory section. In 
order to test the data I employ Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. This type of 
regression is used because of its fairly straightforward results, the fit to the kind of way in 
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which the dataset was coded and the assumptions for this kind of regression which are met 
relatively easy compared to other types of regressions. It is generally the preferable model for 
a response value on an interval scale with one or more explanatory variables which may be 
categorical, as is the case for this data (Hutcheson, 2011: 224). As in other research (such as 
Klüver. 2012) which employs word count as a dependent variable, the variable becomes non-
negative and skewed to the right. Applying a linear regression model to such a variable would 
be to take a risk getting inconsistent or even biased outcomes (Klüver, 2012: 501; Long & 
Freese, 2006: 249). Regarding the results of the regression, multicollinearity needs to be taken 
into account. For those variables that are statistically significant (p < .05) and signal a 
relationship in the same direction (positive or negative) I will check for multicollinearity to 
see whether or not they measure the same relationship, which - if it would remain undetected - 
could lead to false interpretations of the results. 
  Since none of the five dimensions of the dependent variable references, nor the total 
amount of references, nor the second dependent variable causal stories contained a normal 
distribution of results, the data - in order to be more suitable for analysis - was transformed 
using log transformation. In order to prevent the zero scores in the dependent variables to be 
recoded as missing - as zero scores cannot be logged - a score of 1 was added to all the 
dependent variables before logging them so these scores would be included in the analyses. 
However, despite the fact that the variables were logged and the distribution was improved 
towards a more normal distribution, the distributions of both dependent variables were still 
not normal according to the Shapiro-Wilk tests (Field, 2007: 744). Still, some improvement 
was made which justifies using the logged versions of the variables in the regression. Despite 
that the significance of the non-logged and the logged version was similar (.000) in the 
Shapiro-Wilk test for normal distribution, where a significant score indicates a non-normal 
distribution, the significance scores in the associated Shapiro-Francia test were arguably 
better (.000 for the non-logged and .222 for the logged version). While the Shapiro-Francia 
test is generally applied to larger datasets and the Shapiro-Wilk is generally more known for 
its accuracy in smaller datasets, the results of the Shapiro Francia test still indicate that 
logging the variables is indeed a step towards a more normal distribution and therefore an 
improvement (Kilpi & Norros, 2002: 55).   
 This section will proceed as follows. First I will present and discuss the results for the 
various reference dimensions and their relation to the independent variable interest group 
type. Subsequently I will present and discuss the results for the proxy 'Causal Stories', which 
have also have been analysed using OLS regression analyses.  
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Reference Dimensions 
In this section I will discuss the relation between the interest group type and the different 
reference dimensions. In general, contrary to the expectations stated throughout this 
document, there does not seem to be much empirical evidence in the dataset that, based on the 
references as an indicator of expertise, there is significant relation between the type of interest 
group and the amount of expert information they provide in their consultation document. Only 
in the research dimension there is a statistically significant result between the type of interest 
group and the number of references. In none of the other dimension there such a significant  
Table 4.0: Determinants of Expertise Provision to the European Commission 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Analysis 
 
 Model 1 
(Research) 
Model 2 
(Legislation) 
Model 3 
(Actors) 
Model 4 
(Sector 
Specific) 
Model 5 
(Other) 
Model 6 
(Total 
References) 
Interest Group 
Type 
.37 
(.14)*** 
.15 (.22) .02 (.20) -.16 (.23) .05 (.12) .07 (.21) 
Sub-national 
interest 
.19 (.19)** -.19 (.30) .00 (.27) .16 (.31) -.11 (.16) -.03 (.28) 
National 
interest 
-.29(.15) .05 (.22) -.02 (.20) -.48 
(.24)*** 
-.02 (.12) -.18 (.21) 
European 
Interest 
.09 (.20) .21 (.31) -.04 (.28) 1.05 
(.33)*** 
.12 (.16) .39 (.29)* 
Global Interest  .18 (.12) -.12 (.19) -.07 (.18) .47 
(.20)*** 
.15 (.10)* .16 (.18) 
Staff .01 (.01) .01 (.01) -.01 (.01)* -.02 (.01)* .00 (.01) .00 (.01) 
Lobbying 
expenditure 
-.01 (.10) .00 (.02) .01 (.01) .00 (.02) .00 (.01) .00 (.01) 
Brussels Office -.26 
(.15)** 
.24 (.23) -.35 (.21)* -.30 (.25) -.07 (.12) -.15 (.22) 
Constant .54 (.24) 1.45 (.37) 1.25 (.33) 1.08 (.40) .18 (.20) 2.56 (.35) 
       
R2 .15 .04 .04 .14 .03 .03 
N 119 119 119 119 119 119 
 
Note *** P < .05 ** P < .1 * P < .2 
  
result, as p is higher than the generally accepted value of .05, meaning that we have to accept 
the null hypotheses that there is no relation between interest group type and the reference 
dimensions. Breaking these dimensions down to their constituent parts yields some interesting 
results however. The dimensions will be discussed in further detail below. Table 4.0 I presents 
the results from the OLS regression analysis used to analyse the data gathered from the online 
consultation contributions and the Transparency Register with regards to the indicator for 
expertise 'References'. 
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Dimension I: Research. Regarding the first dimension research there is relatively strong 
evidence in the dataset that suggests that there is indeed an relationship between the number 
references to research in a consultation contribution, and the type of interest group. According 
to the results from the regression analysis, the relationship is statistically significant remaining 
well below the crucial range of .05 with a p value of just over .01, indicating that there is a 
almost 99 per cent chance the result is genuine. The relation has a beta coefficient of.37 
entailing - since the value is positive - that diffuse interest groups have a fairly strong 
advantage over business interest groups when it comes to references to research. As the 
variable is logged the value .37 does not refer to the actual number of references as would be 
the case for a non-logged dependent variable, but to a perceptual rise in the number of 
references (Keene, 1995: 815). Therefore, we can conclude from this data that the change in 
the independent variable from 0 (business) to 1 (diffuse) results in a 37 per cent increase in 
the number of references to research. This finding however, does not follow the expectations 
set out in the theoretical sections. Based on the works of Eising (2009) and Hix & Hyland 
(2011) business interest groups were expected to perform better on the indicators for expertise 
because of their greater resources, internal structure and better institutional fit. Regarding the 
references to the dimension research however, the opposite seems to be the case. Not 
contributions by business interest groups, but contributions by diffuse interest are, regarding 
this dimension, better embedded in the state of knowledge. Though this is only the result of 
one dimensions of references which serves as an indicator for expertise, the finding is relevant 
nonetheless because it contradicts the expected pattern for the supply of expert information, 
an expected pattern grounded in a relatively solid theoretical framework. Next to the main 
independent variable, two of the control variables play a role in this dimension as well here. 
Though their probability values are higher (p higher than .05 but lower than .1), whether 
groups have a sub-national interest or a Brussels office are still worth mentioning as potential 
factors of influence on the dimension because of their coefficients. Those who have indicated 
they have a sub-national interest the number of references to dimension research have 19 per 
cent more references to research, while those with a Brussels office use 26 per cent less of 
such references in their contributions. These figures can - with some reservations - be 
interpreted as being in line with the previous finding that diffuse interest groups have a higher 
number of references to research. Business interest groups are generally larger in terms of the 
field they operate in and have more resources, therefore one would expect them to operate 
more frequently on higher levels (so less on sub-national) and to have a Brussels office more 
often. For the latter this is indeed the case. In the dataset business groups outnumber diffuse 
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interest regarding a Brussels office four to one, while those with a Brussels office have a 
lower number of references. This can be regarded as an additional sign that those with more 
resources (mostly business interest groups) do not necessarily contribute more references, 
therefore do not contribute more expertise. 
 When we break the dimension down to its constituent parts, we get a more specific 
idea where the relation comes from. As illustrated by table 4.0 the significant relationship 
between interest group type and the dimension research mainly comes from references to 
research conducted by other organizations (p =.01). Not as statistically significant, but still 
very close to the probability value are references to research conducted by the interest group 
itself (p =.06). Their respective coefficients tell us that diffuse interest groups provide 37 per 
cent more references to research conducted by other organizations than business interest 
groups and 11 per cent more references to research conducted by the organization itself. From 
this we can derive that despite their limited resources and more complex organizational 
capacity, diffuse interest are well-informed with regards to the state of knowledge and spend 
their resources effectively when it comes to producing their own research. Regarding the first 
indicator of the dimension research, researchers by scholars, we see no statistically relevant 
result, not even when we raise the probability value. This could indicate that such types are 
more generally used across the interest groups types and those with different kind of interests. 
 The overall findings for this dimension seem to correspond more closely with those 
authors who have expressed their doubts regarding a bias in the supply of expert information 
to the Commission in favour of business interests. Chalmers (2013: 51) for example, stated 
that he saw no reason for a difference in the evidence-based lobbying across the different 
interest groups. If this would be true, we would have expected a low coefficient indicating 
that there was indeed little difference between the number of references to research. However, 
the figures substantially favour diffuse interest groups over business as contributions by the  
Table 4.1: Dimension I Research 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Analysis 
 
 Research 
conducted 
by Scholars 
Research 
conducted by 
Other 
Organizations 
Research 
conducted by the 
Organization 
itself 
Interest Group Type .05 (.07) .37 (.12)*** .11 (.06)** 
Sub-national interest -.01 (.09) .26 (.17)* -.04 (.08) 
National interest -.16 (.07) -.22 (.13)** .07 (.06) 
European Interest .16 (.09) -.07 (.18) .05 (.08) 
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Global Interest  .13 (.05) .09 (.11) -.02 (.05) 
Staff .00 (.00) .00 (.01) .01 (.00)* 
Lobbying expenditure .00 (.01) .00 (.01) .00 (.00) 
Brussels Office -.05 (.07) -.19 (.13)* -.07 (.06) 
Constant .00 (.11) .53 (.22) -.01 (.10) 
    
R2 .11 .13 .12 
N 119 119 119 
 
Note *** P < .05 ** P < .1 * P < .2 
 
former group contain almost 40 per cent more references than those by the latter. These 
figures correspond with the expectation set out in the works of Klüver (2012) and Hix and 
Hyland (2011). According to Klüver (2012: 97) the diffuse interest groups have in recent 
decades gained lost ground and have adapted to the EU system of lobbying, while Hix and 
Hyland (2011: 226) also see improvement in the lobbying efforts by diffuse interest groups. If 
these improvements have continued, diffuse interest groups may have reached the point where 
they have improved their understanding of lobbying to a level which surpasses the business 
interest groups, leading them to do more with less resources. Such a statements is however 
rather speculative based on only one dimension of the indicator references. Therefore it is 
essential to look at different indicators of expertise, which are included in this research in the 
different dimensions and the proxy causal stories. 
Dimension II: Legislation. Contrary to the results in first dimension, the regression analysis 
has produced no significant results between the independent variables and the dependent 
variable dimension legislation, as can be seen in table 4.0. Neither the type of interest group, 
nor any of the control values have any statistically relevant relation with references to the 
various legislation types of legislation included in this research. In order to demonstrate that 
the relation is virtually non-existent, information on probability scores up to the p=.20 range 
have been included, which would indicate and any relation that would be found would have a 
20 per cent chance of occurring by chance and not because of a genuine relationship between 
the variables. However, even with this highly debatable p value, there is still no indication of 
a relationship between the dependent and the main independent variable, interest group type, 
or between the dependent and any of the control variables. This would indicate that references 
to legislation are quite evenly distributed among both interest group types and among those 
with different interests. Such a finding becomes more interesting than we would suspect if are 
reminded of the explicit theoretical expectations that business interest groups have an 
advantage over diffuse interest groups when it comes to conferring expertise in their 
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contributions to the consultations. If these expectations would have been true, there should 
have been a statistically relevant relation with a negative correlation coefficient regarding 
interest group type and the dimension legislation. As said, there is no such relation. In the 
absence of such a clear relation, as a sub-optimal option one could look at the independent 
variables connected to resources such as staff and lobby expenditure to see whether there is a 
connection between resources and references. If such a relation would exist it could be used 
as a proxy, a 'back-up variable' for interest group type as we know that business groups have 
more resources, therefore if those with more resources provide more references it could be an 
indication that business groups provide more references. However, because of the debatable 
nature of such a 'proxy variable' (since there already is an interest group type variable) it 
would only serve as an indication to take a closer look at the relation between interest group 
type and references. Because there is no relation between both resource variables and the 
legislative dimension and therefore no indication for error in the interest group type, we can 
assume with reasonable certainty that contrary to the theoretical expectations interest group 
type does not influence the legislative expertise that is conveyed in the consultation 
contributions.  
 When we break the dimension down, we see similar results for the individual aspects 
of the dimension when we uphold the value of p <.05. However, even when the probability 
value was raised to .1, the results did not improve as there are no signs of significant 
relationships. Only when raising the value even higher to p=.2, did a relationship between 
having an interest in global affairs and the number of references to global legislation emerge. 
However, as explained before, such a high p value is highly problematic and without any 
additional indicators, and is mainly included to demonstrate the improbability of a 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables. If we were to accept it, we 
would derive from it that groups with a stated interest in global matters, would have a 15 per 
cent higher number of references to global legislation than those groups that have not stated  
Table 4.2: Dimension II: Legislation 
 Ordinary Least Squares Regression Analysis 
 
 National 
Legislation 
European 
Legislation 
Global  
Legislation 
Interest Group Type .16 (.14) .04 (.21) -.01(.11) 
Sub-national interest .12 (.18) -.22 (.29) -.01 (.14) 
National interest .12 (.14) -.02 (.22) .28 (.11) 
European Interest .19 (.19) 24 (.30) .03 (.16) 
Global Interest  .15 (.12) -.23 (.19) .15 (.10)* 
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Staff .01 (.01) .01 (.01) .00 (.01) 
Lobbying expenditure .00 (.01) -.01 (.02) .01 (.01) 
Brussels Office .01 (.14) .27 (.23) .01 (.11) 
Constant .01 (.22) 1.38 (.37) .04 (.19) 
    
R2 .08 .05 .03 
N 119 119 119 
 
Note *** P < .05 ** P < .1 * P < .2 
 
such an interest. This is not particularly surprising and still gives no indication regarding a 
potential relationship between the main independent variable interest group type and the 
number of references to legislation. 
 Despite the overall lack of results in this dimension, the fact that there is no 
relationship where - based on the theoretical expectations - a relationship was expected is still 
interesting. As the first dimension, the second dimension of references does not support the 
hypotheses that business interest contributions to the consultations regime are better 
embedded in the state of knowledge, i.e. contain more expertise. This indicator is more 
supportive of the arguments made by Chalmers (2013), Hix and Hyland (2011) and Klüver 
(2012) that there is no (longer a) difference between the types of interest groups when it 
comes to conveying expertise to the Commission. 
Dimension III Actors. The third dimension, references to actors, seems to be the weakest of 
the five dimensions with the least connections between the number of references and any of 
the independent variables. Even when completely disregarding the probability values, the 
coefficients for this dimension are very low compared to those of the other dimensions. Only 
whether or not the interest groups has a Brussels office seems to have any possible substantial 
effect on the amount of references in this dimension. However, as can be seen in table 4.0 this 
relationship has a p value between .10 and .20 indicating that there is a relatively high chance 
that the presumed relationship between the variables has shown up by chance. Because of this 
high probability factor and the fact that there is - unlike in the first dimension - there is no 
other variable that indicates a similar relation, the Brussels office variable cannot be regarded 
as a possible indicator of a relationship. The only other variable which falls below the p =.20 
range is the control variable staff. However, its impact is marginal (around 1 per cent) and too 
subject to chance that it can easily be disregarded from further analysis. Again, as was the 
case with the legislative dimension, the lack of a substantial relationship between the 
dependent and the main independent variable indicates that hypotheses is incorrect. Where we 
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would have expected to see a relation between interest group type and the number of 
references, we again can derive from table 4.0 that there is no such relation.  
 Breaking this dimension down however, yields some interesting results. In the case of 
references to organizations, the construction of the dimension actors seems to have clouded 
some relationships between the variables. For the main independent variable, interest group 
type, there are no changes, but three of the control variables do seem to have a genuine effect 
(p < .05) on the number of references regarding organizations. According to the results of the 
regression analysis, interest groups that have an interest in sub-national matters have a 43 per 
cent higher amount of references to organizations, while those with a national interest have 27 
per cent lower figure with regards to these references. Another independent variable which 
has a statistically relevant (negative) effect on the numbers of references to organizations is 
Brussels office. As can be seen in table 4.3 those interest groups which have a Brussels office, 
have a 37 per cent lower amount of references to organizations compared to those interest 
groups that do not have a Brussels office. When checking for multicollinearity, to see whether 
the two statistically significant independent variables which indicate a relation in the same 
direction do not measure the exact same relation, we find some mixed results. The R12 score 
is relatively high with .46 (where 1 is perfect multicollinearity), however the Variance 
Inflation Factor score is just over 1 while for in order for the VIF to indicate multicollinearity 
as a rule of thumb a score of 10 is required (Chatelain & Kalf, 2011: 11; Golder & Golder, 
2013: 8; Williams, 2013: 1). These mixed results do not lead us to assume that there is indeed 
multicollinearity between the national interest and Brussels office, but the R12 score does 
signal that the variables have some relation which needs to be taken into account when further 
interpreting these results. For the other variables that constitute the third dimension - 
references to public organizations and references to other actors - there is no indication that 
any of these independent have a genuine effect on either of these dependent variables.  
 Despite a number significant statistics in the breakdown of this dimension, the overall 
conclusion is similar to that of the previous ones: the theoretical expectations are not  
Table 4.3: Dimension III: Actors 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Analysis 
 
 Organizations 
(private/ngo) 
Public 
Organizations 
Other actors 
Interest Group Type .14 (.12) .11 (.18) -.11(.18) 
Sub-national interest .43 (.17)*** -.28 (.24) -.28 (.24) 
National interest -.27 (.13)*** .11 (.18) .11 (.18) 
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European Interest -.07 (.18) -.05 (.25) -.04 (.25) 
Global Interest  .12 (.11) -.14 (.16) -.14 (.16) 
Staff .01 (.01)* .00 (.01) .00 (.01) 
Lobbying expenditure .02 (.01)** -.01 (.01) .00 (.01) 
Brussels Office -.37 (.14)*** .00 (.19) .00 (.19) 
Constant .62 (.21) .78 (.31) .78 (.31) 
    
R2 .15 .03 .05 
N 119 119 119 
 
Note *** P < .05 ** P < .1 * P < .2 
 
confirmed by the analysis of the dataset. The fact that the significant values in the breakdown 
are not strong enough to hold their ground in the broader dimension and the fact that they do 
not appear to uniformly signal a certain type of relationship that can be used to answer the 
research questions, limits their explanatory value. As with the second dimension, the data 
suggests that there is no relationship between the type of interest groups and the number of 
references to actors. Contrary to the expectations, the contributions of business groups are not 
better imbedded into the state of knowledge, therefore do not convey more expertise than 
contributions made by diffuse interest groups, again supporting the arguments made by 
Chalmers (2013), Hix and Hyland (2011) and Klüver (2012). 
Dimension IV: Sector Specific. The fourth dimension, references to sector specific aspects, is 
the only other dimension besides the research dimension which includes a number of 
statistically relevant (p <.05) relationships between the independent variables and dependent 
variable. While there is no statistically significant relationship between the main independent 
variable interest group type and the dependent variable (p >.20), such a relationship does exist 
(p < .05) between the dependent variable and the whether or not the interest group has a 
national, European or global interest. The results indicate that interest group which have an 
interest in national matters, score 48 per cent lower on references to sector specific aspects 
than those that have not indicated that they have such an interest. For those that have indicated 
they have either European or global interests, the effect is reversed. Interest groups with these 
interest score respectively 105 and 47 per cent higher on the number of references to sector 
specific aspects. Results for multicollinearity are not particularly strong with a Variance 
Inflation Factor of well below the 10 and R12 score of only .19. Therefore, we can derive 
from these figures is that contributions from those with an interest in multinational matters 
contain more references to sector specific aspects, than those who have only a national 
interest. This may not be surprising since those actors who operate on a multinational level 
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are generally larger and can be expected to have a broader working field and therefore 
experience more aspects of a sector. This relationship however, which indicates that the type 
of interest preference matters for the number of references, again deviates from the theoretical 
expectation that the type of interest group is the independent variable that matters. More 
specifically, there is no convincing element in these figures that suggests that contributions by 
business groups score higher than diffuse interest groups regarding sector specific references 
as has been stated in the theory section.  
 Breaking the dimension down reveals some interesting dynamics that are somewhat 
clouded if we group the individual reference indicators together. First, it becomes apparent 
that a large part of the relationship between the independent variables interest in 
national/European and global matters and the dimension sector specific references is due to 
the inclusion of the references to other actors. This specific type of reference contains all 
statistically relevant scores below the .05 probability level seen in dimension. Despite an 
improvement in the figure, we still do not see a convincing relationship between the 
dependent variable and the interest group type, as it has a probability value only between .10 
and .20. Second, contrary to what is shown in the dimensions table, having a Brussels office 
becomes statistically relevant with regards to the references to other actors. Table 4.4 signals 
that those who do have a Brussels office, score 48 per cent lower on this indicator of 
references than those who do not have a Brussels office. Again, checking for multicollinearity 
between the independent variables national interest and Brussels office, the result was 
negative: a R12 of -.12 and VIF score of just over 1 indicate that this is not the case. 
 The patterns seen in the previous dimensions are repeated in this one as well. Even 
when we stretch the boundaries of what is regarded as statistically acceptable and tolerate the 
probability level of .17 for the relation between interest group type and references to other 
actors, we do not see evidence for such a relationship in any of the other independent 
variables. For example, in the first dimension there were similar relationships between the 
independent variables interest group type and the dependent variable and the independent 
variable Brussels office and the dependent variable. Assuming there was no multicollinearity  
Table 4.4: Dimension IV: Sector Specific 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Analysis 
 
 Experience Situation Other actors 
Interest Group Type -.11 (.18) .19 (.20) -.30(.22)* 
Sub-national interest -.28 (.24) .00 (.27) -.33(.29) 
National interest .11 (.18) .20 (.20) -.82 (.22)*** 
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European Interest -.04 (.25) .47 (.28)** 1.11 (.31)*** 
Global Interest  -.14 (.16) .12 (.18) .67 (.20)*** 
Staff .00 (.01) .00 (.01) -.01 (.01) 
Lobbying expenditure .00 (.01) -.01 (.01) .00 (.02) 
Brussels Office .00 (.19) .00 (.21) -.48 (.24)*** 
Constant .78 (.30) .08 (.33) .67 (.37) 
    
R2 .05 .06 .22 
N 119 119 119 
 
Note *** P < .05 ** P < .1 * P < .2 
 
(of which there were no indications) both independent variables supported the assumption that 
there was a positive relationship between the interest group type diffuse interest and the 
number of references. Such similar, mutual supportive relationship cannot be distinguished 
here. On the contrary, the relationships with the dependent variable point in different 
directions. Therefore we have to assume, that especially the probability value is above .1, it is 
highly unlikely that the independent variable interest group type and the dependent variable 
other actors is a genuine relationship. The fourth dimensions, nor any of its constituent part 
support the hypotheses, but rather indicate that there is no substansive relation between the 
interest group type and the number of references to sector specific aspects, an indicator of 
sector specific expertise. 
Dimension V: Other. The fifth dimension, other types of references, is similar to dimension II 
en III with none of the independent variables having a statistically significant relationship 
with the dependent variable. Only the control variable whether or not the interest group has a 
global interest seem to have a possible effect of 15 per cent on the numbers of references in 
this dimension. However as the p value is between .10 and .20, we have to interpret this figure 
with caution, as there is a relatively high likelihood that this relationship has occurred by 
chance. The coefficient is rather high with .39, however in the absence of any other 
independent variables (such as European interest) that indicate a similar relation that groups 
with multinational interest would have a higher number of references, the chance that this 
relationship is due to chance can be regarded as too high and therefore not particularly  
Table 4.5: Dimension V: Other 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Analysis 
 
 Media Previous 
Consultations 
Interest Group Type .04 (.10) .03 (.07) 
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Sub-national interest -.03 (.14) -.09 (.09) 
National interest -.04 (.10) .01 (.07) 
European Interest .02 (.14) .14 (.09)* 
Global Interest  .12 (.09)* .05 (.06) 
Staff -.01 (.01) .00 (.01) 
Lobbying expenditure .00 (.00) -.01 (.00)* 
Brussels Office -.11 (.11) .00 (.07) 
Constant .23 (.17) -.03 (.11) 
   
R2 .03 .06 
N 119 119 
 
Note *** P < .05 ** P < .1 * P < .2 
 
relevant.  
 Breaking this dimension down reveals little more than was already visible in table 4.0. 
We can see in table 4.5 that the possible relationship between global interest and dimension V 
is mainly due to references to the media. However, the relationship is based on a p higher than 
.1, so the problems seen in the dimension as a whole are reflected here as well. Looking to the 
other indicator previous consultations, we see a possible effect between whether or not the 
interest group has a European interest and the number of references to previous consultations. 
Those with European interest are indicated to score 14 per cent higher regarding this type of 
references. However, again we are dealing with a p higher than .1, so these results have to be 
interpreted carefully.  
 The overall results of this dimension do not seem to reflect any of the expectations set 
out in the theoretical section. This leads to the conclusion that also in the fifth and last 
dimension, the results again supporting the arguments made by Chalmers (2013), Hix and 
Hyland (2011) and Klüver (2012) that there is no difference between the type of interest 
groups and the conveyance of expertise, measured here as the number of references in the 
dimension other references. 
Causal Stories 
In this section I will discuss the empirical results of the OLS regression analyse between the 
independent variables, the interest group type and the control variables, and the second 
dependent variable, the proxy for expertise causal stories. As stated earlier, results regarding 
the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable references have 
not been according to the expectations set out in the theoretical section and the hypotheses. 
Despite the somewhat higher expectations regarding this variable, as will be explained further 
below the result for the dependent variable causal stories follow along the same lines as the 
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results for the dependent variable references though with somewhat more promising results 
for the main independent variable (interest group type).  
 None of the independent variables, except the main independent variable interest 
group type and control variable European interest, are remotely statistically significant (p at 
least <.20) regarding its relationship with the dependent variable, the amount of words 
dedicated in the consultation document to telling a causal story. While interest group type has 
a relatively high p value of .13 which stretches the concept of what is acceptable (even more 
so in the case of European interest with p=.18) it stays well below the highly debatable .2 
range and at a substantial distance from some of the other variables with p values ranging 
from .36 to .94, indicating a high to very high likelihood that the relationships these variables 
indicate is a result of chance. While we have to proceed with caution when approaching and 
accepting these results, if we accept the relationship as being significant the coefficient 
indicates that the relationship is substantial. According to the results from the regression 
analysis, when controlling from the other independent variables, a shift in the independent 
variable interest group from 0 (business) to 1 (diffuse) will result in a 45 per cent rise in the 
number words dedicated to a causal story in the consultation documents. In other words, if we 
accept the relationship which has a 13 per cent chance of having occurred randomly as being 
statistically signification, we come to the conclusion that, based on this dataset, diffuse 
interest group provide more expert information to the Commission in terms of causal stories 
than business interest groups do. This is contrary to the expectations set at the beginning of 
the research. There is still the other promising independent variable, European interest, which 
has an even higher probability of being caused by chance, but because of its possible impact 
should not be ignored. If we accept the p =.18 as being acceptable, we are confronted with a 
variable that has a substantial coefficient of .56, meaning that groups that indicated they have 
an interest in European matters, have a 56 per cent higher word count regarding causal stories 
than groups that have not indicated such an interest. This could be an indication that those 
who are interested in European matters, have a better understanding of how the lobbying 
process works and therefore know that providing the Commission with causal stories 
increases their chances of successful lobbying. When checking for multicollinearity between  
Table 5.0: Causal Stories 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Analysis 
 Causal Stories 
Interest Group Type .45 (.30)* 
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Sub-national interest .10 (.40) 
National interest -.02 (.30) 
European Interest .56 (.41)* 
Global Interest .18 (.27) 
Staff .01 (.02) 
Lobbying expenditure -.01 (.02) 
Brussels Office -.28 (.32) 
Constant   5.7 (.05) 
  
R2 .05 
N 119 
 
Note *** P < .05 ** P < .1 * P < .2 
 
the two independent variables, we find that this is not the case. Though the number of 
observations is quite low with n=119, the standard deviations are notably different and while 
the R12 is only -.02 (where -1 is perfect negative collinearity). Also, when checking the 
Variance Inflation Factor between both variables, the score of 1 on VIF stays swell below the 
'rule of thumb' score of 10.  
 While the relationship between the size of the causal stories in a consultation 
document and whether or not the interest groups has a European interest cannot tell us very 
much - because of its high p value and the lack of similar independent variables with a 
relation - the relation between the interest group type and the size of the causal story is all the 
more interesting. Though its probability value is high (almost three times the generally 
accepted range of .05) the strength and the direction of the relationship between the dependent 
and independent variable is comparable to the one seen in the first dimension of references, 
which does have a statistically p value far within the acceptable range of .05. Therefore, 
though it may not be the strongest indicator, the dependent variable causal stories as the proxy 
for expertise seem to favour diffuse interest groups as the type of interest groups most likely 
to use more causal stories in their documents and therefore convey more expertise to the 
Commission. Like in the first dimension of references (references to research) the findings are 
not only not supportive of what was expected based on the theoretical framework, but they 
even run contrary to these expectations. It does not only signal that those who argued in 
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favour of a bias towards business interest groups were incorrect, but even that those who 
argued that there was no bias may not be fully correct either. If we combine the results from 
the indicator for expertise reference dimensions with that those of the proxy for expertise 
causal stories, there indications that there is indeed a bias in the provision of expertise, but 
that this bias is more likely to be in favour of diffuse interest groups rather than in favour of 
business interest groups. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Interest groups play an important role in almost any modern political system based on 
democratic principles. Their role is to inform legislators, provide information about public 
support and valuable technical and expert information that helps those who design policy to 
work effectively and take into account the various interest at stake when dealing with 
complex issues. A pluralistic system is one of open access, where a great variety of groups 
ensure that there is a balance of interest in which no side is able to dominate and overpower 
other interest. This is how the system should work in theory. However, as has been explained 
at the start of this article, there are indication that in the case of the European Commission, 
there is a different system; a system of élite pluralism, where systematic variances in the 
access of interest groups can lead to biased politics, which favour one type of interest group 
(business) over the other (diffuse). This article has sought to address this notion of potential 
élite pluralism at the EU level by looking at the provision of expertise - a crucial type of 
information to gain access to the Commission - in lobbying efforts. The results are reassuring 
for those who uphold the European principles of equality and diversity: despite the fact that 
business groups constitute a majority of the lobby groups, have more resources available to 
them and have the advantage of a better institutional fit, there seems to be no systematic bias 
in the provision of expertise in favour of business groups. This research has shown that their 
diffuse counterparts, despite a number of organizational and resource based 'handicaps', are 
doing equally well providing expert information to the Commission in order to make their 
voices heard at the legislative centre of Europe. If anything, diffuse interest groups are shown 
to have a slight edge over business interest groups, which would indicate that the gap between 
both types of interest groups that was there a few decades ago has been closed and that diffuse 
interest groups have adapted well to the institutional changes over the years. 
 A key aspect of this research has been to devise a system by which one would 
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empirically measure the provision of expertise by interest groups to legislators, in this case 
those who work on the various Directorates-General of the European Commission. As has 
been argued before, no such system had been devised yet, despite the extensive use of 
'expertise' by those who write about information based lobbying. Measuring such a complex 
and flexible concept as 'expertise', which has no undisputed and clear definition, is not 
without difficulties, yet this article constitutes a first step towards a better understanding of 
this crucial 'access good'. If we want to understand lobbying strategies and its potential effects 
better, we need to improve our understanding of what expertise is and how it influences those 
who lobby and those who are lobbied. This research has identified 'references' and 'causal 
stories' as important indicators of expertise, assigning more weight to the latter because of its 
more reliable nature. However, despite careful efforts these indicators are not perfect and only 
constitute a first step along a long road towards an solid empirical way to measure expertise. 
There is a role for future research to further elaborate on these indicators, devise additional 
ones and apply them to various kinds of legislative systems. 
 The exploratory work done in this research regarding the empirical measurement of 
expertise constitutes an valuable contributions to the ever-developing field of lobbying 
research and especially information based lobbying from the supply side. However, some 
limitations have to be taken into account. First, this research has only looked at the lobbying 
efforts made by interest groups in written response to the topics put up for debate by the 
European Commission. This means that other ways of lobbying such as more informal ways 
of lobbying or the direct approach of legislations by lobbyist have not been taken into 
account. This is important because the fact remains that groups representing business interest 
still control more resources than diffuse interest groups and may employ them elsewhere, 
thereby still creating a system of élite pluralism. Further research should shed light on this 
question how interest groups employ their resources and what the implications are. Second, 
this research focuses almost exclusively on the supply side of expert information. How this 
information is used and evaluated is still unclear. Despite the fact that this research has found 
no evidence of a bias in the provision of expert information, it could still be the case that 
legislators favour the information of one group over the other, which could still lead to biased 
policies. In order to address this issue, future research must also look at demand side of expert 
information. 
 There is still a lot uncertainty surrounding the concept of expert knowledge and its role 
and impact in informational lobbying. Despite the fact that many difficulties regarding the 
research of this type of information we should not abandon researching the role of expertise in 
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lobbying, especially not with regards to the interest group type. The implications of the 
unequal provision resulting access to decision-makers are too far-reaching for expertise not to 
be researched to the furthest extent possible. 
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